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ABSTRACT: Recent evidence shows that highly skewed sex ratios at birth are observed
not only in China and India, but also for a number of countries in the Southeast Europe
and South Caucasus - a region that has seen eruptions of conflicts following the collapse
of communist regimes. Yet, the role of conflict has been largely overlooked in the relevant
literature on ”missing girls”. We argue that conflict and group survival concerns can exacer-
bate the initial son bias and lead to relatively more male births once low fertility levels and
access to ultrasound technology are given. We test our hypotheses in the context of Nagorno
Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. First, individual-level survey analysis
from Armenia shows that relatively stronger concern over national security and territorial
integrity is significantly associated with son preference. Second, difference-in-difference
panel analysis of community-level census data shows that once ceasefire breaches between
Armenia and Azerbaijan intensified, Armenian communities closer to the conflict region
exhibited relatively higher sex ratios at birth.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The issue of ”missing women” - females who would have been alive if their birth or sur-
vival had not been intentionally interrupted - has received much attention from economists
since Amartya Sen’s series of papers in the late 1980s. This work estimated that about 100
million women were missing, referring to the number of women who have died due to un-
equal access to healthcare and nutrition during childhood (Sen, 1990). The deviation from
natural sex ratios at birth (around 105 boys for 100 girls per 1000 births) is viewed as a
sign of revealed preference for sons in the society. The unusual sex ratios at birth in China
and India have received considerable attention in the relevant literature. Son preference
has been evaluated in terms of attitudes (Westoff and Rindfuss, 1974; Cleland et al., 1983;
Haughton and Haughton, 1998; Kureishi and Wakabayashi, 2011), cultural norms (Li et al.,
2000; Das Gupta et al., 2003; Fogarty and Feldman, 2011) and actions (Park, 1983; Sen, 1990;
Coale, 1991; Klasen, 1994). Not only is such type of sex-discrimination a violation of human
rights, it is also a sign for the existence of deep gender inequalities in the society (Branisa
et al., 2014), which leads to limited opportunities for equal participation in the economy for
half of the population (Sen, 1989). In the long run, gender bias in the economy translates
into loss in economic growth and development (Lagerlo¨f, 2003).
Economists have argued that the costs and benefits associated with boys and girls (Ben-
Porath and Welch, 1976; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982) and parents’ perception of males
as the most productive sex lead to son bias in the society (Ahn, 1995). By the same token,
evidence shows that deterioration of women’s household bargaining power (Klasen, 1998)
and their relatively low earnings potential (Qian, 2008) endangers female survival. Similarly,
Rose (1999) and Das Gupta et al. (2003) suggest that the expected old age support from adult
male children is one of the factors leading to the persistence of son bias in China, India, and
South Korea.
Edlund (1999), on the other hand, models son preference in the context of marriage mar-
kets in India, suggesting that high income, upper class families have stronger son prefer-
ence because the probability of mating is the highest for a well-off male. In her paper, Ed-
lund (1999) adapts a related theory from a biological literature on parental ability to vary
offspring sex ratios according to their expected reproductive success (Trivers and Willard,
1973). Her model suggests that beyond economic drivers, son preference is regarded as a
long-term survival strategy for populations that pass on the family lineage through a male
offspring. In fact, many studies on son preference argue that patrilineal kinship system is
the underlying cause for sex ratio imbalances in Asian countries, which have experienced
sharp fertility decline (and economic growth) in the recent decades (Das Gupta et al., 2003;
Ebenstein, 2010; Li et al., 2011; Jayachandran, 2017).
This paper contributes to the literature on son preference in terms of attitudes and actions
reflected in highly skewed sex ratios at birth. We argue that a threat of conflict (perceived
and real) leads to increased valuation of boys over girls because it is perceived to be the
optimal strategy for group and offspring survival. Given the additional contributing factors
such as fertility decline and availability of prenatal sex detection technology, the conceptual
framework outlined in this paper suggests that populations highly concerned with own sur-
vival will experience larger increase in the average number of sex-selected male offspring.
2We test the hypotheses derived from this framework based on the case of the unresolved
conflict of Nagorno Karabakh between two countries in the South Caucasus - Armenia and
Azerbaijan.
Armenia was covered in the Financial Times for its ”love for boys” and highly skewed sex
ratios at birth (Jack, 2017), comparable to those in China. Due to its small size, homogeneity
in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture, language, equal rights (formally), low fertility levels
and availability of ultrasound technology, Armenia presents an ideal case for this study.
A unique data from the country at individual level for the year 2010, and a community
level data for the 1987-2011 period enable us to estimate the effects of conflict at micro and
meso levels. The findings show that at the individual level, fear of conflict increased the
probability of having son preference by 10 percentage points, estimated using nonlinear
models and matching methods. At the community level, we find that communities closer
to the conflict zone, Nagorno Karabakh, had much higher sex ratios at birth once ceasefire
breaches intensified. The community level estimations control for community-specfic time-
invariant unobservables, community-specific time trends and access to technology, which is
proxied by distance to the capital of Armenia.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 lays out the conceptual framework
while section 3 provides the context and the background of the study. This is followed
by section 4 on individual- and community-level data and descriptive statistics. Section 5
presents the empirical methods and the results. The final section concludes the paper.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Our conceptual framework on conflict, survival and son preference is based on formal
models of prospect theory and conflict (McDermott et al., 2008), cultural transmission of
preferences (Li et al., 2000), and experimental evidence on group identity, conflict and social
behavior (Weisel and Zultan, 2016).
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) have established that the set of individual choices and
preferences in the domain of losses is different from that in the domain of gains (prospect
theory). McDermott et al. (2008) extend this (prospect) theory to conflict situations and show
how individual choices and preferences change following the changes in the political and
economic environment. They focus on risk preference and argue that in the times of abun-
dance (i.e. resources, land, food, security in survival), it is optimal for individuals to be
risk averse because the added value of taking a risk is much lower compared to possible
losses. However, once individuals perceive their survival to be under threat, the optimal
choice for individuals is to make risky choices because the pay-offs in the case of success
are higher. The choices and preferences in the McDermott et al. (2008) model are not related
to survival of individuals; they are related to the survival of offspring, and concern life and
death, reproduction and survival of the related ones. The authors note that situations where
such fundamental choices need to be altered do not happen quite often, however they exist
under conditions of famines, combats, and other disasters associated with political contexts.
In fact, Voors et al. (2012) find that individuals who have been exposed to violent conflict
are more risk-seeking and altruistic, confirming the predictions made by McDermott et al.
3(2008).1 Although McDermott et al. (2008) model only risk preferences, the theory can be
applied to all types of preferences and choices that are related to group survival in general.
Moreover, preference for sons over daughters is a risky behaviour from a parental perspec-
tive, however in case of success the survival of family line is perceived to be more likely
especially in patrilineal societies.
Moreover, experiments show that in the presence of an external threat to a group’s sur-
vival, individual preferences are derived from in-group preferences (Weisel and Zultan,
2016), which lead to a higher probability of group-conforming behaviour among the in-
group individuals. In contrast, when the threat is at an individual level, the individual
preferences are not overwritten by in-group preferences. Hence, one can conclude that per-
ceived external threat to a group survival such as conflict, can lead to choices that are more
group-conforming or traditional, such as son preference.
Preference for sons is embedded in patrilineal and patriarchal traditions. Using historical
data, Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1999) show that sex discrimination existed in India, China
and South Korea for long periods of time because of the rigid kinship systems and the male-
privileging traditions common in all three countries. However, this discrimination increased
further during war, famine and fertility decline in the three countries. For example, the
authors show that in China and South Korea, the largest number of girls ”missing” coincides
with the episodes of war and following famine and fertility decline in these regions in the
mid 20th century. In the case of India, there is evidence that the large share of ”missing
girls” comes from Northern India (Das Gupta and Shuzhuo, 1999), which is also the region
exposed to ethnic and territorial conflict both internally (e.g. Assam, Tripura, Nagaland,
Manipur) and externally (e.g. Kashmir insurgency).2 Hence, one can infer that resource
scarcity and prospects of conflict that endanger group survival lead to traditional and group-
conforming behaviour, namely offspring sex selection. In the case of patrilineal societies
one can expect excessive preference of male-offspring over female-offspring (magnification
effect).
Son preference is also transferred to new generations traditionally from parents to their
offspring (vertical cultural transmission) or by the means of mass media, friends, relatives
and neighbours (horizontal cultural transmission) in the spirit of Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man (1981). Li et al. (2000) model the dynamics of son preference using general theory of
vertical and horizontal cultural transmission based on Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981).
They show that in the case of China, those regions that initially reported higher degrees of
son preference were more sensitive to transmission of son-biased values from friends, rel-
atives and mass media, compared to those regions where the reported son preference was
lower. The model and findings of Li et al. (2000) suggest that once fertility is maintained at
low levels, horizontal transmission of son-biased values increases the sex ratios at birth in
regions where son bias is initially high, but has no affect in regions where son-bias is low
initially. Thus, in the times of turbulent peace, fear of conflict induced by horizontal cultural
transmission (e.g. through mass media, war rhetoric, praise of males as soldiers) is likely
1The alturism can be related to the preference for the survival of the related ones.
2Adverse effects of conflict on overall positioning of women in society has been shown in a recent study by
Ramos-Toro (2018). It does not consider discrimination at birth, however.
4to exacerbate son preference in communities with initially high son bias. In the presence of
fertility decline and ultrasound technology, this would lead to highly skewed sex-ratios at
birth.
The biological literature, on the other hand, explains the imbalances in sex ratios at birth
during and after war periods based on stress hormones, coital frequency and timing. The
findings of this literature are rather ambiguous3 and the predicted consequences disappear
shortly after the war.4 In the case of such biological causes the historical equilibrium around
105 is expected to be restated in the long run, once the trigger is removed. That is, biological
explanations are valid for the short run and when the sex ratios at birth cannot be manipu-
lated. However, the data shows that in some countries these effects have extended decades
after wars (Figure 1), possibly because the affected populations continue to perceive their
group’s survival at stake and can also manipulate the sex of their offspring. The group sur-
vival concern can be due to the one-child policy that disproportionately affected the Han
population group in China (Li et al., 2011), ongoing conflicts affecting the populations in the
Northern India or intense militarization in South Korea up to 1990s as well as recent conflicts
and ongoing ceasefire violations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus5.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We illustrate the line of our main argument in Figure 2. Based on the theories discussed
above, we argue that conflict, as an external threat to group survival, has an influence on
both collective (group) and individual values. Not only individual values are influenced
by conflict directly, they also bear the influence of the group values. More specifically, the
threat of conflict in patrilineal societies makes the values of praising males as defenders of
the group more salient. This leads to valuing a boy more than a girl not only due to individ-
ual motives of continuing the family line, but also due to collective motives of ensuring the
survival of the group (magnification effect). In addition, groups with initially (traditionally)
high level of son bias are expected to be influenced the most by the threat of conflict. In
result, traditional and collective values exacerbate the son preference and frame individu-
als to perceive male offspring as the optimal choice for reproduction, given the constraints.
3According to Kemper (1994) and James (1997), higher coital frequency in the early stages of cycle increases
the probability of having a male offspring and such behaviour is common when soldiers return home. Mean-
while, James (2009) and James and Valentine (2014) suggest that changes in stress hormones can explain the
fall in sex ratios observed during and shortly after a wartime. However, when these two explanations are
combined - psychological stress during war and coital rates right after war - the biological effect of wartime on
sex-ratios at birth becomes unclear.
4In the context of World War II, Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2014) argue that tight marriage markets led
to an increase in the percentage of boys among the newborns in Bavarian communities in Germany during
and shortly after the war. However, they do not explore the mechanisms at play. Further empirical evidence
from Tajikistan during the civil war in 1992-1997, from Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Yugoslavian war in
1991-1995, and the famine in Ukraine in 1933-1936, show that these episodes were followed by increases in
male-female sex ratios at birth (Adamets, 2002; Hohmann et al., 2010).These effects faded away couple of years
after the war and end of the famine.
5It is paramount to stress that highly skewed sex ratios at birth are not observed when there is no fertility
decline as families would engage in stopping behaviour once a boy is born. Since all births occur naturally, the
distortions in sex-ratios would be minimal. This, however, does not mean that the underlying problem with
son preference is absent.
5In the presence of fertility decline, which itself adds an additional constraint over individ-
ual choices, and modern technology, the increased preference for sons is manifested in the
skewed sex ratios at birth.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Thus, we test the following hypotheses to support our argument:
Hypothesis 1. Individuals highly concerned about conflict are more likely to express preference for
sons.
Hypothesis 2. Exposure to threat of conflict leads to higher sex ratios at birth given the initial levels
of son bias.6
We test our hypotheses in the context of Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. The next section describes the case in more detail.
3. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
Since 1990s sex ratios at birth have been increasing beyond the boundaries of East and
South Asia. As data from the World Bank (2015) show, the three countries in the South
Caucasus and also some in Southeast Europe have also seen sharp increases in sex ratios
at birth. As Figure 1 reveals, the sex ratios at birth are in fact the highest in Armenia and
Azerbaijan compared to the other countries in the two regions, reaching the levels observed
in China.
Both of these regions have also experienced recent conflicts. Among these are the Bosnian
war (1992-1995), the Albanian civil war (1997), the Kosovo war (1998-1999) in Southeast Eu-
rope. Conflicts in the South Caucasus include the Abkhazia conflict (1998), the Adjaria con-
flict (2004), the Kodori conflict (2006), and the Russia-Georgia conflict (2008), all in Georgia,
and the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh Territory involving Armenia and Azerbaijan
(Nagorno-Karabakh war 1992-1994), which remains unresolved to date.
In his 2017 speech at the UN General Assembly former President of Armenia, Serzh
Sargsyan, stressed that Nagorno Karabakh conflict has been the ”most important and in-
tricate” challenge for Armenia since its accession to the United Nations in 1992 (Sargsyan,
2017). As media analysis and conflict resolution documents on Nagorno Karabakh point out,
the threat of a conflict is a primary concern in Armenia not only at government level, but
also among the population (”Yeni Nesil” Journalists Union and Yerevan Press Club, 2009;
De Waal, 2010; International Crisis Group, 2011).
The territory of conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), a primarily Armenian-populated re-
gion, was assigned to Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1920s by the USSR government (The World
Factbook, 2017). In 1988 Nagorno Karabakh, an autonomous region within Azerbaijan So-
viet Socialist Republic (SSR) with majority Armenian population,7 declared a union with
Armenian SSR, and later in 1991, an independence from Azerbaijan SSR (De Waal, 2003).
6This hypothesis assumes fertility decline and access to ultrasound technology.
7In 1989, before the outbreak of Nagorno Karabakh war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, about 72
percent of the population in Nagorno Karabakh were Armenians and around 22 percent Azeris (USSR, 1991).
6However, neither the union with Armenia in 1988, nor the independence referendum were
officially recognized by Baku as the referendum was boycotted by Azerbaijani population
in NK and regarded as unconstitutional by Azerbaijani government, based on Soviet consti-
tution de jure in force at the time (De Waal, 2003; Freizer, 2014). The action resulted in a full
blown war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NK and led to massive displacements
and ethnic killings on both sides (De Waal, 2003, 2010) The . Figure 3 presents the map of
Nagorno Karabakh highlighting the territorial situation at the time of ceasefire agreement.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The ceasefire agreement in May, 1994 put a hold onto full-scale war. Yet, the clashes be-
tween Armenian and Azerbaijani troops have been increasing since 2008 in their frequency
and intensity (International Crisis Group, 2011). From the Armenian and NK perspective,
NK has been legally separated from Azerbaijan since December 1991 referendum and has
been de facto independent as the 1992-1994 war resulted in Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from
NK. Yet, the government of Azerbaijan rejects the referendum and change of its territo-
rial landscape as it regards NK as an inseparable part of its territory (Freizer, 2014). The
2009 International Crisis Group briefing warned on the difficulty of sustaining the Nagorno-
Karabakh status quo (International Crisis Group, 2009), while the International Crisis Group
(2011) biefing already called for an urgent action to prevent a war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan: ”An arms race, escalating front-line clashes, vitriolic war rhetoric and a virtual
breakdown in peace talks are increasing the chance Armenia and Azerbaijan will go back to
war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Preventing this is urgent” (p.1).
Thus, the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains
unresolved since 1994 with high uncertainty of peace due to the absence of peace agree-
ment and numerous violations of ceasefire agreement since 2008 (International Crisis Group,
2011). In the case of Armenians, the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh is viewed as both eth-
nic and territorial issue related to national (group) identity. Hence, individuals within the
group (Armenians) may regard this as a threat to a group’s (nation’s) survival. Homogene-
ity in ethnicity, the small size of the group and its territory are likely to make the concern
over group’s survival a primary issue.8
A United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report and the data therein based on house-
hold and women surveys in Armenia (Abrahamyan et al., 2012), shows that the third most
frequently given reason for son preference is: ”boys are defenders of homeland” (Figure 4).
In addition, the published report shows that the prevalence of son preference in an indi-
vidual’s immediate environment (friends, neighbors) is higher than that within own family.
According to Abrahamyan et al. (2012), in the individual’s immediate social environment,
the (perceived) share of people with son preference is ten times higher (59.3%) relative to
8Armenia has a largely homogeneous population in terms of ethnicity (98.1% Armenians), language (Ar-
menian: 97.9%) and religion (92.1% Apostolic Christians)(The World Factbook, 2017). In addition, the rela-
tively small size of the Republic of Armenia (population of 3,045,191), compared to Azerbaijan (population of
9,961,396; ethnic Azerbaijani: 91.6%; Azeri language: 92.5%; Shia Muslim: 96.9%) indicates that an ethnic and
territorial conflict is likely to increase the perceived threat for a group’s survival according to the conceptual
framework described in Section 2.
7those with daughter preference (5.6%); whilst according to the same report, within individ-
ual’s extended family the perceived share of people with son preference is six times higher
than the share of people with daughter preference (p.28).
[Figure 4 about here.]
Moreover, a local media analysis on the influence of TV in shaping social behaviour of
teenagers in Armenia (Martirosyan et al., 2015) shows that the most popular show on the
Armenian TV is the one called ”In the Army” (”Banakum”), which describes the daily life
of army servants in a humorous manner. Service in the national army of Armenia is based
on the draft at the age of 18 and lasts two years. As part of this, young males are also
’randomly’ located to serve in the conflict region of Nagorno Karabakh. Another media
analysis on the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations (”Yeni Nesil” Journalists Union and Yerevan
Press Club, 2009) shows that almost all of the coverage about Azerbaijan in the Armenian
media is related to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict (same pattern for the Azerbaijan media
on Armenia).
Thus, one can infer that horizontal cultural transmission of group survival values is at
play in the context of Nagorno Karabakh conflict. It is clear that the conflict concerns are
quite present in the media and among the individuals in Armenia. In result, the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict has indirectly created an environment were males are valued as the de-
fenders of the country (Dudwick, 2015).
Armenia has been characterized with low levels of fertility since late 1980s. Since 2000, it
has been around 1.5, below the replacement level, with negligible variations from one year
to another (World Bank, 2015). Moreover, due to various reasons, abortions in Armenia and
in the wider South Caucasus have become a common method for controlling fertility levels
and achieving desired sex composition of offspring (Michael et al., 2013; Dudwick, 2015),
which is reflected in highly skewed sex ratios at birth.
In sum, Armenia presents an highly relevant setting to test the link between conflict, son
preference and skewed sex ratios at birth. Existing individual level data from the country
enables us to test the link between son preference and fear of conflict, whilst the community
level census data allows us to construct a natural experiment where the perceived threat is
set to vary with the distance to the center of the conflict region and the period of intense
clashes after the ceasefire agreement. The next section describes the data used for this anal-
ysis in more detail.
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our study uses an individual-level dataset to test the hypothesis 1 and a community-level
dataset to test the hypothesis 2 from section 2. Namely, the individual-level dataset allows
us to explore the link between concerns over conflict and son preference. We then test the
effect of threat of conflict on sex ratios at birth by employing a community-level dataset. The
description of these datasets follows.
Individual-level data. To study the individual-level correlates of son preference, we use
unique data drawn from the Caucasus Barometer (CB), an annual nationally-representative
household survey on a wide range of demographic, social, economic and political variables
conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) since 2004. The CB is one
8of the few high-quality datasets in the countries of the South Caucasus and has been used
in other published studies on the region (e.g., Habibov and Afandi, 2011; Antinyan, 2016;
Mavisakalyan and Meinecke, 2016; Mavisakalyan, 2018).
We use the 2010 wave of the survey since it includes information on the respondents’ son
bias not available in other waves. This also matches the last period in the community-level
dataset. Our sample consists of adults aged 18-80 years old, 1,861 observations in total,
which comprises 97% of the raw sample.9 Additionally dropping the observations with
missing values leads to a sample of 1,676 observations employed in the baseline analysis.10
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The
CB 2010 contains questions that ask about the respondents’ prioritisation of the two most
important issues facing the country. Based on that, we define the variable FEAR OF CON-
FLICT that takes on the value 1 if a respondent reported insurance of peace or territorial
integrity as one of their top concerns and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 21% of people are
concerned about conflict, as captured by this variable.
As Table 1 demonstrates, FEAR OF CONFLICT is clearly related to SON BIAS, our dependent
variable that takes on the value 1 if the respondent’s preferred gender for a single-child
family is a boy and 0 otherwise. While 54% of all respondents have son bias, son bias is
significantly more prevalent among those who are concerned about conflict compared to
those who have no such concern (a difference of 14 percentage points).
Our analysis controls for standard demographic and socio-economic characteristics of in-
dividuals. We allow the preferences over the gender of a child to differ by the respondents’
gender, age and family status and include controls for these characteristics.11 Males com-
prise 49% among those who have no fear of conflict and 52% among those who have such
fear. Older individuals as well as those who have a partner are more prevalent among those
who fear of conflict compared to those who don’t.12
We control for individuals’ education, distinguishing between those with school edu-
cation and below, EDUC≤ 10, comprising 42% of the sample; secondary technical or in-
complete university education, EDUC 11-14, comprising 35% of the sample; and a first or a
higher-level university degree, EDUC≥ 15 (omitted category), comprising 23% of the sam-
ple.13 Fear of conflict appears to increase with educational attainment. Forty-three percent
of individuals who don’t fear of conflict have no more than 10 years of education; among
9The remaining 3% are those over the age of 80. The results are largely insensitive to the presence of these
individuals.
10The number of missing observations for the key variables of interest is small; e.g. data on the variables
used in the construction of measures for son bias and conflict as a primary concern are missing for 0.64% of
individuals only.
11While we distinguish between individuals with or without a partner, we do not include the number
of children as a control in the baseline regressions since differences in fertility decisions are endogenous in
our context. Controlling for the number of children the respondent actually has or for the ideal number of
children s/he thinks a family should have leaves the results unaffected; these variables are also insignificant
throughout. The results are available on request.
12We explored the possible non-linearity in the relationship between age and son bias, by additionally con-
trolling for an age-squared term; the estimates on this term were insignificant throughout.
13The definitions are based on the number of years of education associated with the three levels of at-
tainment, following the approach taken in previous studies (Duncan and Mavisakalyan, 2015; Mavisakalyan,
2018).
9those who do fear of conflict the share of those with no more than 10 years of education is
36%. On the other hand, 22% of individuals who do not fear of conflict and 27% of those
who do fear of conflict have a university degree.
The next group of covariates is economic standing of individuals. We control for employ-
ment status, distinguishing between those with or without a job. Employment rate is 39% in
the sample. Among individuals who fear of conflict, 43% are employed; this is considerably
higher than the employment rate of 38% among those with no fear of conflict. Looking at
self-reported measures of relative economic standing yields similar results. We distinguish
between individuals who perceive their economic standing to be poor (21%), fair (65%) and
good (14%). In the sample of individuals who report not having fear of conflict, 22% are of
poor economic standing. Among those who do fear of conflict 16% perceive their economic
standing to be poor. Meanwhile, the share of individuals with good economic standing is
slightly higher among those who fear of conflict compared to those who don’t fear of con-
flict.
Finally, we include dummies for the location of residence, distinguishing between the
residents of capital cities, comprising 34% of the sample; other urban localities, comprising
33% of the sample and rural localities, comprising the remaining 33% of the sample. Among
individuals who fear of conflict, 39% reside in rural localities, relative to 31% rural residents
in the sample of those who do not fear of conflict. Yet, urban residents comprise 31% of
those who fear of conflict and 34% of those who don’t have such fear.
[Table 1 about here.]
Community-level data. We use data from 2001 and 2011 Population Censuses of Armenia.
Armenia has 11 administrative divisions, including 10 provinces (marzes) and the capital
- Yerevan. Our dataset comprises 72 communities within these provinces and Yerevan, in-
cluding all the cities and towns, as well as the largest villages (with over 5000 inhabitants)
in the country. The median number of communities in a province is 6, with a minimum
number of 3 and maximum of 15 across the provinces.
The census data provides de jure (officially registered) and de facto number of individuals,
disaggregated by gender and age groups. The age groups are defined in categorical terms:
0-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, and so on. Based on this, we calculate the number of boys and
girls of 0-4 years of age in the following periods: 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2006
and 2007-2011. The way we do this is by using the 2001 census to construct the number of 0-
4 years old females and males up to 2001; we use the data from 2011 census thereafter. Since
some of the small communities were included in the second but not in the first census, we
make use of the older age cohorts in the 2011 census (namely, 20-24 years olds), to construct
the de jure 0-4 years-old population for those initially missing communities.14 It is important
to note that the use of census 2001 for 1987-1991 ignores the child mortality in-between,
however it is likely to be low as infant mortality rate in Armenia was much below the world
average in 1990 (37.9 infants per 1000 live births, it decreased to 15.3 in 2011) (World Bank,
2015).15
14If individuals have migrated but not officially changed their residence status before the birth of the child,
then their migration is not registered in the de jure data.
15The world average infant mortality rate in 1990 was 60.7 per 1000 live births.
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We construct a pre-treatment period by aggregating the data from the two pre-ceasefire
periods that are similar to census age group intervals: 1987-1991 and 1992-1996. Although
the ceasefire agreement was in 1994, in our study the period stretches to 1996 because the
census data includes information on age groups only and not on each age specifically for
each community in our sample. The average sex ratio at 0-4 ages during the war period
and right after it (1992-1996) was 107 compared to 105 in the pre-war period from 1987-1991.
However, as Figure 5 shows, the sex ratios at 0-4 ages have the opposite pattern during
the war relative to pre-war period - communities closer to the conflict region Stepanakert
have lower sex ratios at 0-4 ages. Yet, there is a large heterogeneity in sex ratios at 0-4 ages
among the communities further away from Stepanakert observed by quite dispersed data
points and large confidence intervals. Such short-term changes in SRB (figure 6 shows that
it reversed again after the war) can be due to war-related deaths or migration that dispro-
portionately affected families with boys in some communities.16
[Figure 5 about here.]
Thus, we use a community-based panel dataset of sex ratios for 0-4 years-olds in 4 peri-
ods: a pre-ceasefire period that stretches from 1987 to 1996, and three post-ceasefire periods,
namely, 1997-2001, 2002-2006, and 2007-2011. On the one hand, the aggregation of the war
period with the pre-war period normalizes the distribution of the sex-ratios at birth before
the ceasefire, and, on the other hand this solves any possible serial correlation problems
before the treatment at a community level (Bertrand et al., 2004). We use two variables of
geographic distance as a proxy for exposure to conflict and ultrasound technology, respec-
tively. For that purpose we use the travel distances in kilometers from each community to
Stepanakert, the center of Nagorno Karabakh conflict region, as a proxy variable for the fear
of conflict. We use the travel distance to the capital city of Armenia, Yerevan, as a proxy for
access to ultrasound technology. Distance is commonly used in the literature as an instru-
ment or a proxy for conflict exposure and access to markets (Voors et al., 2012; Verwimp and
Van Bavel, 2013).17
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6 depicts the correlations between sex ratios at 0-4 years of ages (”M/F Sex Ratio”)
and the distance to the center of Nagorno Karabakh, Stepanakert, for all four periods. In
the period of 1987-1996 and 2002-2006, we observe a slightly negative correlation between
the sex ratios in this age group (SRB) and community’s distance to Stepanakert. However,
confidence intervals are quite large for detecting any statistically significant differences. In
the 1997-2001 period, the relationship seems slightly non-linear, again with large confidence
intervals. In the last period of 2007-2011 we observe a strong inverse relationship with small
confidence intervals indicating that the further away a community is from Stepanakert the
lower is the SRB. The strongest effects are driven by communities that are between 200-
350 km away from Stepanakert (less or around the average distance). Note that this is the
period when the number of ceasefire breaches started to intensify between Armenian, NK
and Azerbaijani troops. Based on these observations, we divide our sample of communities
16This is however a mere speculation as we do not have detailed data on refugees or deaths to confirm.
17We do not employ other measures for conflict exposure due to lack of reliable and available data on
fatalities and casualties over the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the post-ceasefire period.
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into treatment and control groups, and take the average distance to Stepanakert as the cut-
off point. Communities are assigned to the treatment group if their distance to Stepanakert
is less than the cut-off; see the map of ’treated’ and ’control’ communities in Figure 7.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Table 2 shows that in the baseline period (pre-ceasefire) mean SRB in treatment commu-
nities is higher compared to the communities in the control group (107 vs 105). In addition,
travel distance to Yerevan is larger for the treatment communities while the average distance
to Stepanakert is smaller by construction.
[Table 2 about here.]
Next, we present the formal empirical analysis of the link between fear of conflict and son
bias.
5. METHODS AND RESULTS
Our empirical analysis on the link between fear of conflict and son bias proceeds in two
steps. We start with individual-level estimations to study how fear of conflict affects son bias
in terms of attitudes. We then analyse the relationship at the level of communities, focusing
on son bias in terms of actions by directly looking at the sex ratios at 0-4 ages. In what
follows, we present the details of employed empirical methods followed by discussions of
associated results in each step.
Individual-level. To evaluate the baseline relationship between fear of conflict and son bias,
we consider a model in which the propensity for son bias, Bias∗i for an individual i is as-
sumed to depend on the fear of conflict, Feari together with series of additional controls Xi
for demographic, socio-economic and location characteristics. Unobserved factors εi further
contribute to the propensity for son bias, leading to an equation of the form
Bias∗i = Xiβ+ δFeari + εi for all i = 1, ..., N. (1)
Observed son bias Biasi is assumed to relate to latent propensity through the criterion Biasi =
1(Bias∗i ≥ 0), so that the probability of having a son bias under an assumption of normality
for εi becomes
Pr(Biasi = 1|Xi, Feari) = Φ(Xiβ+ δFeari), (2)
with marginal effect of fear of conflict derived from the estimated model thus:
∂Pr(Biasi = 1|Xi, Feari)
∂Feari
= δφ(Xiβ+ δFeari). (3)
Baseline results. The marginal effects described in (3) evaluated at the sample means are re-
ported in Table 3. We start with a parsimonious specification which excludes the additional
controls Xi. Consistent with the descriptive statistics in the previous section, the estimated
marginal effect for this parsimonious model reported in column (1) confirms a significant
and positive relationship between FEAR OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS.
Next, we control for the demographic characteristics of individuals. The results reported
in column (2) demonstrate that males are more likely to hold a son bias than females. Inter-
estingly, age is negatively related to the probability of son bias, while having a partner has
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no statistically significant effect. Controlling for these variables does not affect the positive
significant relationship between FEAR OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS.
Education attainment of individuals is accounted for in the estimates reported in column
(3). University-educated individuals are less likely to hold son bias relative to those with
lower educational attainment. While the estimates on EDUC≤ 10 and EDUC 11-14 are highly
economically and statistically significant, their inclusion leaves the estimated marginal effect
on FEAR OF CONFLICT largely unaffected.
In column (4) we report the marginal effects from the regressions that control for employ-
ment and relative overall economic standing of individuals in addition to their demographic
characteristics and educational attainment. We do not find a significant relationship between
these variables and SON BIAS, while the significant positive effect of FEAR OF CONFLICT per-
sists.
Finally, we account for the type of the residential localities of individuals by distinguish-
ing between the residents of capital cities, other urban areas and rural areas. The last column
of Table 3 reports the results. Those who live in rural areas are significantly more likely to
have son bias, relative to the residents of capital cities. These results also confirm the posi-
tive relationship between FEAR OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS. The marginal effect of changing
FEAR OF CONFLICT from zero to one, after accounting for the entire list of baseline covari-
ates, is equal to 12.2 percentage points. This implies that the probability of having a son bias
is almost 23% higher.
[Table 3 about here.]
Alternative measurement of key variables. The previous sub-section established a strong posi-
tive association between FEAR OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS. Here we explore whether this
result is sensitive to the way our key measures are defined.
In Table 4 we study the robustness of the results to the definition of FEAR OF CONFLICT
we use. To allow for comparisons, column (1) restates the baseline estimates with full set
of controls (these are identifcal to those reported in column (5) of Table 3). Next, we disag-
gregate FEAR OF CONFLICT along two dimensions. First, we investigate whether the degree
of concern with peace or territorial integrity matters by refining our measure to distinguish
between those who identiy these matters as a first or as a second priority. The results using
dummies for these two groups are reported in column (2) (omitted category are those who
do not perceive peace/national security to be a key national issue). We estimate positive
marginal effects on both of these variables, however only that on CONFLICT 1ST CONCERN
is statistically significant. Second, we introduce a distinction between those who think peace
is a key national issue and those who think territorial integrity is. In column (3) we report
the results of regressions that include dummies for these groups as the key explanatory vari-
ablles. The marginal effects on both PEACE AS CONCERN and INTEGRITY AS CONCERN are
positive and significant.
[Table 4 about here.]
Second, we explore whether FEAR OF CONFLICT has an effect on other dimensions of
gender bias beyond its effect on son bias at birth. We therefore employ alternative dependent
variables in the analysis reported in Table 5 (column (1) restates the baseline estimates). The
CB 2010 contains rich information on the respondents attitudes on gender roles. Based on
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this information, we generate dummy variables to distinguish the following individuals
from others: (i) those who believe a university education is more important for a boy than
for a girl; (ii) those who think men should have more right to a job when jobs are scarce;
(iii) those who think the man should normally be the breadwinner in the family; and (iv)
those who believe the man should be the decision-maker in the family. The results of the
regressions using these measures of gender bias as the dependent variables are reported in
columns (2)-(5) of Table 5. They suggest that the negative effects of the FEAR OF CONFLICT
potentially extend to other dimensions of gender bias including the beliefs around the rights
for education, jobs and earnings, but not around the decision-making in the household - the
marginal effect on FEAR OF CONFLICT when MEN SHOULD BE THE DECISION-MAKER is
employed as the dependent variable is insignificant (column (5)).
[Table 5 about here.]
Analysis by different sub-samples. The analysis in the previous sub-section extended the base-
line results by employing alternative measures of the dependent variable and the indepen-
dent variable of interest. Here, we further explore the possible heterogeneity in the effect
of FEAR OF CONFLICT according to several observable characteristics of individuals. The
results of this exercise are summarised in Table 6.
First, we consider whether males and females respond differently to fear of conflict by
re-estimating the baseline model separately for the two groups. The results reported in
the first two columns of Table 6 confirm that the positive significant relationship between
FEAR OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS is observed in the sub-samples of both males and females.
However, the magnitude of this effect is stronger for males: the marginal effect of changing
the dummy FEAR OF CONFLICT from 0 to 1 is 14.9 percentage points in the sub-sample of
males, and 7.6 percentage points in the sub-sample of females.
Second, we explore the possible heterogeneity by age group. To that end, we re-estimate
the baseline model in the sub-samples of relatively older (46-80 years old) and younger (18-
45 years old) individuals. In both sub-samples, FEAR OF CONFLICT is associated with an
increased probability of SON BIAS. The effect is particularly pronounced in the older cohort:
the marginal effect of FEAR OF CONFLICT on SON BIAS is 14.1 among 46-80 years-olds and
10.3 among 18-45 years-olds.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 6 we analyse the relationship between FEAR OF
CONFLICT and SON BIAS by educational attainment, distinguishing between those without
and with post-school education. While in both samples we confirm the baseline finding,
interestingly, we estimate a larger marginal effect of FEAR OF CONFLICT on SON BIAS among
individuals with post-school education. For individuals with at most 10 years of education,
the marginal effect of changing the variable FEAR OF CONFLICT from 0 to 1 is equal to 10.2;
for those with 11 or more years of education (corresponding to the tertiary education years)
it is equal to 13.8.
[Table 6 about here.]
Addressing endogeneity. We establish a significant positive relationship between FEAR OF
CONFLICT and SON BIAS and we demonstrate that it largely persists when alternative mea-
surements of the two variables are employed as well as when we limit the analysis to specific
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groups of individuals. However, FEAR OF CONFLICT may be correlated with unobserved
characteristics that affect SON BIAS, leading to biased estimates. Here, we attempt to miti-
gate the effect of unobserved heterogeneity using several approaches.
First, we simply add proxy variables that could be correlated with the unexplained com-
ponents of SON BIAS. The results of this analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 7. To
allow for comparisons, column (1) restates the results of the baseline model with no addi-
tional controls.
In the baseline results we established that the probability of SON BIAS decreases with hu-
man capital, as captured by educational attainment. Our estimates of FEAR OF CONFLICT
would be biased, if FEAR OF CONFLICT varied by hitherto unobserved dimensions of hu-
man capital. Here we attempt to capture for human capital more completely, by addition-
ally controlling for Russian language proficiency of individuals, an important ingredient
of human capital in transition countries (Duncan and Mavisakalyan, 2015; Mavisakalyan,
2017). We distinguish between those who have some fluency in the language (report ad-
vanced/intermediate knowledge), those who speak it at home, and others. As seen in the
results reported in column (2), Russian proficiency appears to be negatively correlated with
SON BIAS, similar to the effect of educational attainment established earlier. However, the
estimated marginal effects are not statistically significant, and their inclusion does not affect
the estimates on FEAR OF CONFLICT.
Next, we consider several potential sources of conservative attitudes of individuals, that
may be correlated with both FEAR OF CONFLICT as well as SON BIAS. First, we explore the
potential role of the exposure and attitudes to foreigners by including two additional con-
trols in the regression. We distinguish between those who had not had any trips outside
the country within the preceding 5 years and those who had. We additionally include a
proxy for individual’s racial tolerance constructed based on their approval of marriage with
Chinese people.18 While we do not find a statistically significant relationship between trav-
elling overseas and having a son bias, we establish that racially tolerant individuals are less
likely to have son bias. In spite of this, the positive significant relationship between FEAR
OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS persists.
We also explore whether accounting for religion may alter the central result of this study,
by controlling for individuals’ religious affiliation, distinguishing between those with ma-
jority (Armenian Apostolic Church) religious affiliation and others; as well as for their reli-
giousity, distinguishing between those who consider themselves ’very religious’ and others.
Doing this leads to a drop in the sample size due to missing values on the measures of re-
ligion. In this sample, using the augmented list of control variables we estimate a marginal
effect of 10.7 on FEAR OF CONFLICT. While smaller in magnitude compared to the estimate
from the baseline model, this is still a highly significant effect.
Next, we explore an additional possibility: that individual vulnerability may affect fear of
conflict as well as being related to reinforcement of traditional values such as son bias. To
mitigate the bias that such possibility may introduce, in the regressions reported in column
(5) we control for two additional variables. First, we include a dummy that takes 1 if the
18The choice of this measure is largely driven by data availability (e.g. there is no information on attitudes
to African people in the dataset).
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individual claims there are enough people to whom he/she feels close to and 0 otherwise.
We include a second dummy variable, which takes 1 if the individual experiences ’a general
sense of emptiness’ and 0 otherwise. There is no statistically significant link between these
variables and SON BIAS; the statistically significant effect of FEAR OF CONFLICT persists.
Finally, in column (6) we additionally control for institutional trust, a variable that may
be linked to fear of conflict as well as mediating cultural values individuals hold. We focus
on a relevant institution for our context, army, distinguishing between those individuals
who have a distrust in army and others. The estimated marginal effect on DISTRUST IN
ARMY, while insignificant, potentially suggests that son bias may be prevalent among those
who are lacking institutional trust.19 The estimated marginal effect on FEAR OF CONFLICT is
positive and statistically significant, although it drops from 12.2 to 10.8 after including these
additional controls. Nevertheless, this is a highly economically significant effect, implying
that the probability of having a son bias is 20% higher for those who have the fear of conflict.
Given the richness of information available in the dataset, the approach of controlling for
previously omittted characteristics of individuals adopted so far potentially mitigates the
influence of important sources of unobserved heterogeneity, however it does not eliminate
it entirely. A more direct way of addressing the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in the
presence of a binary dependent variable and a binary endogenous variable is to estimate
a bivariate probit model, subject to availability of instrument. We identify one plausibly
exogenous instrument in our application, HISTORY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT. This is a
dummy variable that takes 1 for individuals who were either themselves forced to move
or were displaced during the Communist regime or had a household member who was
explosed to such forced displacement, and 0 otherwise.
We exploit this additional variable to estimate a bivariate probit model, where it is in-
cluded in the equation of FEAR OF CONFLICT but excluded from the equation of SON BIAS.
The results reported in Panel B of of Table 7 confirm the positive significant relationship be-
tween FEAR OF CONFLICT and SON BIAS. In support of our identification strategy, we also
estimate a highly statistically significant coefficient on HISTORY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT
in the regression of FEAR OF CONFLICT.
[Table 7 about here.]
The exclusion restriction underlying this approach would be violated if there is the pos-
sibility that the HISTORY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT affects SON BIAS through mechanisms
other than FEAR OF CONFLICT. Naturally, it is not possible to control for all possible vari-
ables that might be correlated with the HISTORY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT and SON BIAS.
Hence, we take a third strategy to reduce the bias generated by unobserved heterogeneity:
we employ a matching approach to examine the impact of FEAR OF CONFLICT on SON BIAS
for individuals who have a fear of conflict (treatment group), compared to those who do
not have such fear but are as similar as possible with regard to characteristics that affect the
19We additionally explored the probability that the effect of FEAR OF CONFLICT on SON BIAS may vary
among those trusting and distrusting army by including an interaction term of FEAR OF CONFLICT and DIS-
TRUST IN ARMY in the regression. The results on the interaction term were insignificant.
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outcome variable of interest (control group). Formally, our measure of interest is the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) which is estimated based on matching as follows:
τATT(x) = E[Bias(1)|T = 1, X = x]− E[Bias(1)|T = 0, X = x] (4)
where Bias is our outcome variable, T indicates whether an individual is explosed to treat-
ment (T = 1) or not (T = 0) and x is a vector of relevant characteristics that affect the
outcome varaiable. First, we employ entropy balancing to select matches for the units ex-
posed to treatment (Hainmueller, 2012). Entropy balancing is in a way a generalisation of
conventional matching approaches since it employs a synthetic control group that repre-
sents ”a virtually perfect image of the treatment group” (Neuenkirch and Neumeier, 2016,
p. 113). Second, we follow a more traditional approach employing propensity score match-
ing (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8. First, we report the estimates of ATT
based on using entropy balancing to select matches for individuals explosed to treatment
(column 1). In columns (2) and (3) we report the average treatment effects from kernel and
radius matching estimators. The estimated effects in all three cases are statistically signifi-
cant and similar in magnitude. This further confirms that FEAR OF CONFLICT has non-zero
and potentially large positive effect on son bias of individuals.
[Table 8 about here.]
Community-level. We estimate the differences in sex ratios at 0-4 ages in communities
closer to the conflict region before and after ceasefire using difference-in-difference estima-
tion strategy. We use travel distance between each community and Stepanakert, the center
of Nagorno Karabakh conflict region, as a proxy for ”fear of conflict”, and distance to the
capital city of Armenia, Yerevan, as a proxy variable for access to advanced ultrasound
technology. Distance is commonly used as a proxy variable or an instrument in the con-
flict literature (Voors et al., 2012). In addition, as described in section 3, the conflict over
Nagorno Karabakh started due to territorial independence requests by large share of Arme-
nian population in the disputed region. These factors are independent of sex ratios at birth
in Armenian communities close to the center of the Nagorno Karabakh - Stepanakert.
To identify the effect of fear of conflict on son bias at the community level, we use a panel


















ηc(Cc ∗ t) + µc + ect
(5)
where SRBct is the outcome variable - male over female sex ratios at 0-4 ages - in com-
munity c in period t. α is the constant term that denotes the differences in average SRBct
when t = 0. Postt are the period dummies after 1996; the three time intervals (1997-2001,
2002-2006, 2007-2011) correspond to the three dummy variables for post-ceasefire periods
(t = 1, 2, 3). The baseline period is 1987-1996 (t = 0). The period dummies also capture the
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fertility decline during each period that affected all communities.20 We focus on the de jure
number of 0-4 year olds since this gives us the actual information on children born to that
specific community.
∑3t=1 ζt(Postt ∗ CloseCapitalc) denotes period interaction terms with the distance to the
capital city of Armenia (Yerevan), which teases out the community differences in access to
ultrasound technology. The term ∑Nc=1 ηc(Cc ∗ t) captures the community level linear time
trend that we include to control for the time-varying community-specific effects that also
relaxes the common trend assumption of the difference-in-difference setting. µc denotes
community fixed effects and ect is the error term clustered at the community - treatment-
level (Bertrand et al., 2004). In this setup we are able to identify whether the period of
ceasefire breaches led to changes in pre-existing community-specific trends in the ’treated’
communities. Migration out of the communities is not included in the dataset, which should
rather result in a downward bias in our estimates. On the other hand, population flows
should be captured by community-specific time trends in case of linearity of the migration
patterns.
In our main specifications community c is included in the treatment group (Treat) if its
distance to the center of conflict region (Stepanakert) is smaller than the mean distance in
the sample (the cut-off). Otherwise, it is in the control group (Treatc = 0). We are interested
in the coefficient on Postt ∗ Treatc when t = 3: we expect to observe the ’treatment effect’ in
the period from 2007-2011 when ceasefire breaches intensified (International Crisis Group,
2011).
Figure 8 tests for common trends assumption in communities assigned to treatment and
control groups. The vertical axis denotes male over female sex ratios at 0-4 ages (SRB). The
red line depicts the SRB trends in the treatment group and the blue line - in the control group.
Period 0 corresponds to the baseline time interval, 1987-1996. Period 1 corresponds to the
first period after the ceasefire, namely 1997-2001, period 2 corresponds to the second period
post ceasefire, 2002-2006, and period 3 corresponds to the third period after the ceasefire,
2007-2011. The sex ratios at birth in the treatment group are structurally higher than in the
control group. But we observe that the treatment and control groups have parallel trends
in the baseline period, and in the second to third period there is a slight divergence. In
the third to forth period we observe quite divergent paths between treatment and control
groups, where the SRB increases even further in the treatment group while it decreases in the
control group. Next, we present the results from the regression analysis of the community
level panel data.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Results. We present the community-level regression analysis using continuous measures of
distances at the first instance (Table 9). Having established that a unit (km) change in dis-
tance to conflict is inversely correlated with the changes in SRB, we present the results for
20Data from Armenia Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) shows that fertility ratios across Armenian
provinces and communities do not differ from each other at the conventional levels of statistical significance,
based on own calculation of the authors. DHS data and the census data used in the analysis match only on 40
communities, i.e. cities and towns. The rest of the DHS communities are very small villages of less than 5000
people (DHS, 2012).
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treatment and control groups in Table 10. We follow up with tests for robustness of our
findings in Table 11.
Column 1 of Table 9 displays the effects of each treatment period on the outcome vari-
able SRB. The results show that with each subsequent period, sex ratios at birth have been
increasing in all communities in Armenia (statistically significant at the one percent level).
Column 2 adds an interaction term with Distance to Conflict, a continuous variable mea-
sured in kilometers. The estimates of the coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that
there is no statistically significant relationship between unit increase in distance to the cen-
ter of conflict region (Stepanakert) and SRB. We observe similar results in column 3, when
period dummies interacted with Distance to Capital (Yerevan) are controlled for. Thus, the
results from columns 2-3 show that neither access to technology nor proximity to the conflict
explain changes in SRB unconditionally. To pursue our hypothesis further, in column 4 we
consider the effect of Distance to Conflict on SRB, when access to technology is controlled
for. We observe that in period 3, a 100 kilometer decrease in the distance to conflict (closer
to Stepanakert) leads to SRB values close to 113, statistically significant at the five percent
level (Post=3 × Distance to Conflict).
[Table 9 about here.]
Table 10 presents the main results for the community level analysis based on equation
5. Building on the initial results in Table 9, we assign the communities into treatment and
control groups as described in section 4. In column 1 of Table 10 we estimate the differential
effects of post ceasefire periods on the treatment and control groups, without controlling for
the distance to technology. The coefficient of the interaction term Treat=1×Post=3 shows
that in the third period after the ceasefire, when the clashes started to intensify the sex ratios
at birth increased by 9 in the treatment communities compared to the control communities,
statistically significant at the five percent level.
In column 2 of Table 10, we separately test the effects of access to ultrasound technology
(Close to Captial) on SRB. Close to Capital is a binary variable that equals 1 if a community’s
distance to the capital city Yerevan is less than the sample average. The results in column 2
show that access to technology is associated with an increase in SRB only in the first period
after the ceasefire. Beyond the first period, the differential access to technology does not
explain the differences in SRB across communities.
In column 3 Table 10, we observe that compared to the column 1, the period effects for
Post=1 and Post=2 are smaller, which implies that much of the increase in SRB during this
period may be driven by the increased access to technology. Nevertheless, the effects in
the third period are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and the interaction term
with the treatment group (Treat=1×Post=3) shows that communities in the treatment groups
experienced additional increase in the SRB in the third period.
Columns 1-3 in Table 10 include community fixed effects, which also control for community-
specific time invariant omitted variables. While Figure 8 shows that common trends as-
sumption holds for the treatment and control groups, in column 5 we relax this assumption
by including community specific linear time trends. The community time trends control
for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity within the communities. Once community time
trends are included, we observe that the coefficients on the period dummies turn negative
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and the size of the treatment effect in the third period increases by 6 points. In addition, the
interaction terms with the Distance to Capital also become statistically significant in all three
periods. These results help us to calculate the treatment effects for those communities that
are closer to Yerevan and also closer to the conflict region - this would be the most affected
communities. Here the fear of conflict would increase the preference for sons and the ease
of access to technology makes it easier to act according to these preferences. The treatment
communities observe 15 points higher SRB levels (e.g. 121) in the period when ceasefire
violations started to intensify (2007-2011), compared to the pre-ceasefire period. The results
in 10 also show statistically significant period dummies, especially in the second and third
post-ceasefire period. Interestingly, the coefficients on the period dummies are positive be-
fore inclusion of the community level linear time trends, after the inclusion the coefficient
turn negative. One possible explanation is that period dummies capture the fertility decline
that is a country-wide phenomenon, not captured by distance variables. However once com-
munity level linear time trends are included, the variation in the SRB at the community level
due to linear part of fertility decline is controlled for. The negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficients of period dummies then imply that controlled for the fertility decline and
access to technology, the sex ratios at birth in the control communities decreased compared
to the treatment communities.
[Table 10 about here.]
In Table 11 we test for the robustness of the result in Table 10 column 4. As Figure 6
shows, there are two communities in the sample that can be regarded as outliers. Therefore,
in column 1 of Table 11, we re-estimate the model by excluding the two outliers. In this case
we observe that both proximity to the capital city and to the center of the conflict region
increase the level of SRB in the treatment group.
Since the landmass of Armenia is quite small, many of the communities can be in the
treatment group and also in the group that is Close to Capital. To deal with this issue of
confounding effects, we re-assign the communities into two different groups based on the
cut-off of 25th percentile instead of the mean distance. Thus, those communities that are
in the 25th percentile of the distance to conflict region are assigned to the treatment group,
Treat25. Similiary, those communities that are in the 25th percentile of the distance to the
capital - Yerevan - are assigned to the Close to Capital25 group. This way we can com-
pare the conflict effects on the communities closest to the conflict region and the technology
effects on the communities closest to the capital.
Column 2 of Table 11 shows that in the second and the third periods SRB was 10 and
18 points higher in the Treat25 group, statistically significant at the one percent level. We
also find that the effects of technology on the communities in the close proximity to capital
persist in all the three periods, and increase over time, statistically significant at least at the
five percent.
Finally, in column 3 of Table 11, we run a placebo test by falsely defining the treatment
group as those communities who have less than average distance to a northern city in Arme-
nia that is close to the Turkish border - Gyumri. While Armenia has historically-determined
testy relationship with Turkey, there is no actual conflict on that border. The results on the
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interaction term between GyumriDist and the period dummies show negative and no sta-
tistically significant relationship. In third period, there is a small and negative relationship
between distance to Gyumri and SRB, statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This
placebo test confirms that our results are not driven by some type of unobserved heterogene-
ity correlated with distance itself but rather with the fact of being close to the conflict itself
may lead to an increase in SRB.
[Table 11 about here.]
6. CONCLUSION
This study shows that conflict is an important contributor to high sex ratios at birth. We
argue that by raising group survival concerns, it has the potential to exacerbate the son
bias in a patriarchal society undergoing transitions to low fertility and increased access to
ultrasound technology. We test this intuition in a context of a transition country that has seen
both an eruption of a major inter-state conflict and a dramatic increase in sex ratios at birth in
recent times - Armenia. At individual level, we compare those similar across a wide range of
observable characteristics yet different in the extent of concern about the conflict facing their
country. We show that the probability of having a son bias is 20% higher for individuals who
are concerned about conflict. We then focus on communities, comparing those with similar
access to technology, time-invariant characteristics and time-varying community level time
trends but differently exposed to the conflict due to their differential distance to the conflict
zone. We find that communities with less than average distance to the center of conflict
zone experience 15 points higher sex ratios at birth (moving from 107 to 122 male births for
100 female births) in the periods of intense ceasefire breaches compared to the pre-ceasefire
period.
That conflict may matter (and matter a lot) is a novel insight to the ’missing girls’ litera-
ture. Our findings point towards potentially damaging consequences of conflict in broader
settings, and offer a note of caution regarding gender equity in the war-torn countries of
the wider region (Southeast Europe, Middle East, North Caucasus) and beyond. A possible
policy suggestion based on our results is to provide greater gender-equity-focused public
education and awareness campaigns in areas affected by conflict.
Our paper is a first attempt at exploring the association between conflict and missing
girls. Several promising opportunities for future research remain. Establishing external va-
lidity of the results by exploring other contexts is essential. This study has highlighted some
highly relevant cases extending beyond the usual examples of China and India - Albania,
Azerbaijan, Georgia. Furthermore, our conceptual framework suggests that the mechanisms
leading to son bias in a society facing a conflict threat have relevance for other gender equity
outcomes. Indeed, our individual level results point at potential implications for access to
education and jobs. Thus, the compounded gender equity consequences of conflicts are an
important ingredient of this research agenda. Methodologically, there are several possibil-
ities for refining the approach taken here, subject to data availability. While a strong em-
phasis of our empirical set-up has been on mitigating the issue of unobserved heterogeneity,
it cannot be eliminated entirely in the absence of truly exogenous sources of variation in
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the explanatory variable of interest (individual analysis) or when proxies are used to mea-
sure it (community analysis). By combining individual- and community-level analysis, our
aspiration has been to not only study the reduced-form relationship between conflict and
sex ratios at birth, but to empirically trace the mechanisms underlying the relationship. By
showing that the son preference of individuals threatened by conflict is affected, we made
a step in that direction. Looking at actual histories of abortion would be another important
step, if relevant data becomes available.
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Note. Sex ratios at birth (male births over female births) from 1962 to 2016 for countries with relatively high
values, five year averages. Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2015).
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Figure 3: Nagorno Karabakh conflict: Unresolved territorial disputes after the war
Note. Source: De Waal (2010), p.161
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Figure 4: Reasons for son preference: Armenian households, 2011
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Investment in the daughter is not justified
Raising a daughter is a burden
The daughter cannot provide financial support
The daughter is not a support for her parents in old age
Entire burden of household chores and care is on women’s shoulders
It pains a parent to see the daughter’s hardships
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It is psychologically difficult to give daughter in marriage
After she gets married, the daughter is no longer yours
Sons personify authority and strength
Sons are guarantors of material well-being
Sons can provide financial support
Boys are defenders of homeland
Sons are inheritors of property
Sons continue the family lineage
Note. The source is the household survey conducted in 2011 within the framework of Strengthening Sexual
and Reproductive Health Services project (Abrahamyan et al., 2012). Responses are based on survey question
asked in the sub-sample of women who express son preference: ”Why does your family give preference to
sons rather than to daughters?” More than one answer could be given.
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Note.Two-way quadratic prediction plots for the outcome variable SRB before and during war periods. The
vertical axes denote sex ratios at 0-4 ages. The horizontal axes denote distance to the capital of the conflict
region - Stepanakert - for each community in the sample. The green dots denote observations for each com-
munity in the sample. The blue lines represent the fitted values with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: Distance to conflict and sex ratios at birth in Armenia, 1987-2011
Note.Two-way quadratic prediction plots for the outcome variable SRB in each period. The vertical axes denote
sex ratios at 0-4 ages. The horizontal axes denote distance to the capital of the conflict region - Stepanakert - for
each community in the sample. The green dots denote observations for each community in the sample. The
blue lines represent the fitted values with 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 7: Treatment and control communities: Armenia
Note. Orange dots denote communities in the treatment group and purple dots denote communities in the
control group. Selection into ’treatment’ is based on an arbitrary cut-off point, which is the mean travel distance
to the capital of Nagorno Karabakh - Stepanakert. Stepanakert is denoted with a red dot.
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Table 1: Individual-level descriptive statistics
Variables Definition Mean
(s.d.)
No Fear Fear All
FEAR OF 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if the peace/terri- 0 1 0.21
CONFLICT torial integrity are rated as key national issues (0.41)
SON BIAS 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if the preferred 0.51 0.65 0.54
gender for a single-child family is a boy (0.50) (0.48) (0.50)
MALE 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent is 0.49 0.52 0.50
a male (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
AGE Respondent’s age in years 40.87 42.96 41.30
(16.42) (15.83) (16.32)
PARTNERED 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent has 0.66 0.69 0.67
a partner (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
EDUC≤ 10 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent has 0.43 0.36 0.42
at most 10 years of education (0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
EDUC 11-14 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent has 0.35 0.38 0.35
between 11 and 14 years of education (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
EDUC≥ 15 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent has 0.22 0.27 0.23
15 or more years of education (0.42) (0.44) (0.42)
EMPLOYED 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent 0.38 0.43 0.39
reports having a job (0.48) (0.50) (0.49)
POOR STANDING 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if household’s 0.22 0.16 0.21
perceived economic standing is relatively poor (0.41) (0.37) (0.40)
FAIR STANDING 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if household’s 0.65 0.68 0.65
perceived economic standing is relatively fair (0.48) (0.47) (0.48)
GOOD STANDING 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if household’s 0.14 0.16 0.14
perceived economic standing is relatively good (0.35) (0.36) (0.35)
CAPITAL CITY 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent lives 0.34 0.31 0.34
in capital city (0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
OTHER URBAN 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent lives 0.34 0.30 0.33
in urban area (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
RURAL 0-1 binary variable; equals 1 if respondent lives 0.31 0.39 0.33
in rural area (0.46) (0.49) (0.47)
N 1318 358 1676
Note.—Means are representative of the population. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Male/female sex ratios at 0-4 ages (SRB) at baseline 105.26
(6.46)
Travel distance to Yerevan in km 69.90
(61.49)
Travel distance to Stepanakert in km 340.45
(36.62)
Number of communities 47
Treatment group
Male-female sex ratios at 0-4 ages (SRB) at baseline 107.64
(7.01)
Travel distance to Yerevan in km 153.93
(88.85)
Travel distance to Stepanakert in km 203.91
(45.96)
Number of communities 29
Note.—Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3: Baseline individual model — probit marginal effects
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.122***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
MALE 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.098***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
AGE -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PARTNERED 0.043 0.043 0.035 0.010
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
EDUC≤ 10 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.090**
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035)




POOR STANDING -0.021 -0.000
(0.044) (0.044)






Pseudo R2 0.010 0.023 0.033 0.035 0.069
N 1723 1696 1693 1676 1676
Note.— Dependent variable is SON BIAS. Marginal effects for a discrete
change of a variable from 0 to 1 for a person with FEAR OF CONFLICT=0;
controls are fixed at sample means. Standard errors in parentheses. *De-
notes significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
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Table 4: Individual model with alternative independent variables — probit marginal effects
Control variables (1) (2) (3)
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.122***
(0.030)
CONFLICT 1ST CONCERN 0.126***
(0.035)
CONFLICT 2ND CONCERN 0.072
(0.046)
PEACE AS CONCERN 0.096***
(0.035)
INTEGRITY AS CONCERN 0.123***
(0.046)
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.069
N 1676 1676 1676
Note.— Dependent variable is SON BIAS. CONFLICT 1ST
CONCERN/CONFLICT 2ND CONCERN is 0-1 binary vari-
ables which equals to 1 if the peace/territorial integrity
are rated as the 1st/2nd national issue; PEACE AS CON-
CERN is 0-1 binary variables which equals to 1 if peace is
rated as the 1st/2nd national issue; INTEGRITY AS CON-
CERN is 0-1 binary variables which equals to 1 if territo-
rial integrity is rated as the 1st/2nd national issue. Mar-
ginal effects for a discrete change of a variable from 0 to
1 for a person with FEAR OF CONFLICT=0 (CONFLICT 1ST
CONCERN=0; CONFLICT 2ND CONCERN=0; PEACE AS CON-
CERN=0; INTEGRITY AS CONCERN=0); controls are fixed at
sample means. Standard errors in parentheses. *Denotes
significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent lev-
els.
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Table 5: Individual model with alternative dependent variables— probit marginal effects
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.122*** 0.067** 0.063** 0.044** 0.014
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027)
Baseline controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.031 0.037 0.028 0.044
N 1676 1641 1628 1686 1678
Note.— Dependent variable is: SON BIAS in column (1); EDUCATION IS MORE
IMPORTANT FOR BOYS in column (2); MEN SHOULD HAVE MORE RIGHT TO
JOBS in column (3); MEN SHOULD BE THE BREADWINNER in column (4), MEN
SHOULD BE THE DECISION-MAKER in column (5). Marginal effects for a dis-
crete change of a variable from 0 to 1 for a person with FEAR OF CONFLICT=0;
controls are fixed at sample means. Standard errors in parentheses. *Denotes
significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
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Table 6: Individual models by different sub-samples - probit marginal effects
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.149*** 0.076* 0.141*** 0.103** 0.102** 0.138***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.039)
Baseline controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.059 0.085 0.065 0.065 0.074
N 824 852 864 812 695 981
Note.— Dependent variable is: SON BIAS. Sample is limited to: males in column (1);
females in column (2); 46-80 years-old individuals in column (3); 18-45 years-old indi-
viduals in column (4); individuals with at most 10 years of education in column (5) and
individuals 11 or more years of education in column (6). Marginal effects for a discrete
change of a variable from 0 to 1 for a person with FEAR OF CONFLICT=0; controls are fixed
at sample means. Standard errors in parentheses. *Denotes significance at 10 percent; **at
5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
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Table 7: Individual model with comprehensive controls
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Univariate probit estimates
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.108***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
RUSSIAN FLUENT -0.013 -0.011 -0.027 -0.030 -0.036
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
RUSSIAN NATIVE -0.084 -0.102 -0.108 -0.111 -0.126
(0.076) (0.078) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
NO OVERSEAS TRIPS 0.010 0.026 0.025 0.028
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
RACIAL TOLERANCE -0.084*** -0.071** -0.075** -0.074**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
RELIGIOUS MAJORITY 0.006 0.007 -0.008
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074)
VERY RELIGIOUS -0.027 -0.024 -0.018
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
HAS CLOSE PEOPLE -0.015 -0.001
(0.040) (0.041)
FEELS EMPTINESS -0.008 -0.002
(0.029) (0.029)
DISTRUST IN ARMY 0.038
(0.034)
Baseline controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.070 0.074 0.077 0.074 0.074
N 1676 1671 1649 1430 1409 1387
B: Bivariate probit estimates
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.066*
(0.036)
Comprehensive controls included Yes
N 1363
Note.— Dependent variable is SON BIAS. Panel A reports the marginal effects for a discrete change of
a variable from 0 to 1 for a person with FEAR OF CONFLICT=0. Panel B reports the bivariate predicted
probability; controls are fixed at sample means. Standard errors in parentheses. *Denotes significance
at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels. In the bivariate probit model, HISTORY OF FORCED
DISPLACEMENT is excluded from the equation of SON BIAS but is included in the equation of FEAR OF
CONFLICT with an estimated coefficient of 0.334 significant at 1 percent level.
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Table 8: Matching estimations
(1) (2) (3)
FEAR OF CONFLICT 0.093*** 0.104** 0.095**
(0.026) (0.046) (0.041)
N 1387 1387 1387
Note.—Column (1) reports average treatment effects
on the treated obtained by weighted least squares re-
gressions where observations in the treatment group
have a weight of 1 and observations in the control
group have a positive weight obtained from match-
ing using entropy balancing; the full set of match-
ing covariates are included as control variables. Col-
umn (2) and column (3) report the average treatment
effects from Kernel and radius matching estimators
with bandwidth = 0.0009 and with standard errors cal-
culated from bootstrapping with 50 replications; the
propensity scores are calculated using the entire set of
comprehensive controls from Table 7; * denotes signif-
icance at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1
percent level.
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Table 9: Community model: Post-ceasefire effects using continuous distance measures
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post=1 8.511∗∗∗ 2.392 12.565∗∗∗ 11.891
(2.171) (8.505) (2.759) (11.089)
Post=2 9.625∗∗∗ 9.928∗ 11.338∗∗∗ 15.287∗
(1.901) (5.338) (2.471) (7.820)
Post=3 10.912∗∗∗ 25.808∗∗ 11.689∗∗∗ 35.043∗∗∗
(2.375) (10.579) (2.599) (11.306)
Post=1 × Distance to Conflict 0.021 0.002
(0.028) (0.032)
Post=2 × Distance to Conflict -0.001 -0.012
(0.018) (0.022)
Post=3 × Distance to Conflict -0.052 -0.071∗∗
(0.033) (0.034)
Post=1 × Distance to Capital -0.040 -0.039
(0.029) (0.033)
Post=2 × Distance to Capital -0.017 -0.022
(0.017) (0.021)
Post=3 × Distance to Capital -0.008 -0.038
(0.028) (0.026)
Constant 96.528∗∗∗ 106.042∗∗∗ 106.061∗∗∗ 106.061∗∗∗
(1.033) (0.875) (0.874) (0.859)
Community FE YES YES YES YES
Number of communities 76 76 76 76
Observations 298 298 298 298
Note. The dependant variable is SRB: male over female sex ratios at 0-4 ages. Dis-
tance to Conflict is a continuous variable that measures travel distance in kilometres
to the capital of Nagorno Karabakh - Stepanakert - for community c. Distance to
Capital is a continuous variable that measures travel distance in kilometres to the
capital of Armenia - Yerevan - for each community c. Distance to Conflict is a proxy
measure for the ”fear of conflict” and Distance to Capital is a proxy variable for
the ease of access to ultrasound technologies. Post=1, Post=2 and Post=3 denote
three periods following the ceasefire agreement. Standard errors are clustered at the
community level. *Denotes significance at 10 percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent
levels.
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Table 10: Community model: Post-ceasefire effects using treatment and control groups
Control variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Post=1 8.782*** 4.334 2.082 -5.188
(2.245) (3.044) (4.064) (4.615)
Post=2 9.711*** 7.928*** 6.965* -6.944**
(2.078) (2.111) (3.616) (3.389)
Post=3 7.296*** 12.965*** 7.452** -13.307***
(1.766) (3.695) (3.286) (1.896)
Treat=1 × Post=1 -0.711 3.686 6.453
(4.020) (4.405) (5.870)
Treat=1 × Post=2 -0.233 1.576 6.079
(3.383) (4.372) (4.075)
Treat=1 × Post=3 9.088** 9.021** 15.604***
(4.511) (4.325) (2.207)
Close to Capital =1 × Post=1 7.935** 9.543** 15.153***
(3.714) (4.202) (5.162)
Close to Capital=1 × Post=2 3.194 3.885 16.766***
(3.271) (4.241) (3.718)
Close to Capital=1 × Post=3 -4.204 -0.371 19.226***
(4.089) (3.651) (2.118)
Constant 106.035*** 106.070*** 106.064*** 106.237***
(0.869) (0.877) (0.858) (0.967)
Community time trend No No No Yes
Community FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of communities 76 76 76 76
Observations 298 298 298 298
Note.The dependant variable is SRB: male over female sex ratios at 0-4 ages. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the community level. *Denotes significance at 10 per-
cent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
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Table 11: Community model: Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3)
Control variables w/o outliers 25th percentile placebo
Post=1 -3.705 0.091 5.896∗
(4.397) (3.015) (3.329)
Post=2 -5.909∗ -7.670∗∗∗ 2.641
(3.300) (2.254) (2.559)
Post=3 -13.158∗∗∗ -15.910∗∗∗ 2.672∗∗
(1.885) (1.333) (1.284)
Treat=1 × Post=1 10.109∗∗
(4.930)
Treat=1 × Post=2 8.632∗∗
(3.574)
Treat=1 × Post=3 15.972∗∗∗
(2.180)
Close to Capital=1 × Post=1 12.979∗∗∗ 9.037∗
(4.761) (5.298)
Close to Capital=1 × Post=2 15.247∗∗∗ 7.415∗∗
(3.534) (3.597)
Close to Capital=1 × Post=3 19.008∗∗∗ 7.515∗∗∗
(2.095) (2.242)
Treat25=1 × Post=1 4.890
(4.757)
Treat25=1 × Post=2 10.266∗∗∗
(3.436)
Treat25=1 × Post=3 18.293∗∗∗
(1.823)
Close to Capital25=1 × Post=1 10.846∗∗
(4.764)
Close to Capital25=1 × Post=2 18.558∗∗∗
(3.357)
Close to Capital25=1 × Post=3 21.798∗∗∗
(1.793)
GyumriDist=1 × Post=1 -5.365
(5.540)
GyumriDist=1 × Post=2 -0.692
(3.799)
GyumriDist=1 × Post=3 -4.248∗
(2.352)
Constant 105.941∗∗∗ 105.941∗∗∗ 105.941∗∗∗
(0.693) (0.707) (0.697)
Community time trend YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES
Number of communities 74 74 74
Observations 290 290 290
Note.The dependant variable is SRB: male over female sex ratios at 0-4 ages.
Standard errors are clustered at the community level. *Denotes significance at 10
percent; **at 5 percent; ***at 1 percent levels.
